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Abstract
We develop a model that considers a number of foreign multinationals transferring
technology to their a¢ liates in a host country where these a¢ liates also compete with
a local rm. We nd that in less developed countries local investment is less likely to
be fully displaced by multinationals. This is a result of lower technology transfer by
multinationals in these countries. The host country government may further nurture
local rms by restricting the number of foreign multinational companies, however, we
nd that this will also reduce host country welfare. Furthermore, we nd that product
market competition from local rms may induce foreign multinationals to transfer
more technology. This in turn enhances the scope for FDI crowding in e¤ects due to
possible technological spillovers. Finally, we show that opposing local rm and host
country government preferences, concerning entry by the local rm, provide a possible
explanation for successful FDI policy initiatives observed in practice.
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1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) ows to developing countries have increased rapidly in
recent years. Developing countries have taken over the lead from developed nations in
attracting the largest amount of FDI.1 Host country benets from FDI are likely to depend
on the degree to which multinational corporations (MNCs) are involved and the role local
rms play. Host countries want to prevent FDI from crowding out local rms. At the same
time host countries are increasingly aiming to benet from technology and knowledge transfer
by foreign multinationals. We develop a model that considers a number of multinationals
transferring technology to their subsidiaries in a host country where these a¢ liates also
compete with a local rm. The proposed framework allows us to analyze whether FDI crowds
out local investment and it allows us to nd the e¤ect of local competition on technology
transfer by foreign multinationals.
We show that FDI will less likely fully displace local rms in less developed countries.
This is in line with the empirical ndings of e.g. Blonigen and Wang (2004). They nd FDI
crowding out e¤ects in advanced countries but not in developing countries.2 The rationale
behind our result is that due to higher cost of technology transfer, in less developed coun-
tries, multinational corporations will transfer less technology to their a¢ liates. This in turn
weakens the competitive position of multinational a¢ liates and improves the competitive
position of the local rm. We also nd that the often imposed restriction on FDI of limiting
the number of foreign multinationals, may protect local rms from crowding out e¤ects, but
it will also reduce host country welfare in developing countries.
Furthermore, we nd that in competitive markets, technology transfer to the host country
increases with competition from the local rm. By transferring more technology to their
subsidiaries, multinational corporations provide their a¢ liates with a technological advantage
over the local rm (strategic e¤ect). Hence, as pointed out in the empirical study of Kokko
1UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014.
2Empirical results in Agosin and Machado (2005) show FDI crowding out e¤ects in Latin America but
not in Africa (except in sub-period: 1990s) and also not in East Asia.
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and Blomström (1995), policies that promote competition from local rms in order to enhance
technology transfer by multinationals can be alternative policy measures to formal technology
transfer requirements.3
Another often imposed restriction on FDI is the limitation on foreign ownership. Equity
restrictions are often imposed in order to maintain national control of resources. However,
we found that if foreign companies have to form a joint venture partnership with a local
rm as is often the case in e.g. natural resource sectors, it may become unprotable for the
local rm to enter the market. In this case the government can improve host country welfare
by taking away joint venture ownership shares from the local rm. A similar measure was
taken in Norways oil and gas sector in the 1980s when the government took away signicant
ownership shares of Statoil and put them under direct control of the government through
the so called States Direct Financial Interest (SDFI).4
The exiting theoretical literature mainly considers the entry mode of a foreign multi-
national in a market dominated by local rms (see e.g. Mattoo et al., 2004; Ethier and
Markusen, 1996; Markusen, 2001; Saggi, 1996, 1999). In Mattoo et al. (2004) an advanced
multinational enters a host country either directly or by acquiring one of the local rms. In
their framework the multinational always transfers less technology to the host country as
local competition increases. However, numerous industries such as automobile, electronics,
extractive and chemical industries, are dominated by multinationals and national rms play
a more minor role (similar point is made by Markusen and Venables, 1998).5 Multinationals
in these industries not only compete in the product market but they also strategically in-
teract in technology transfer. We extend the existing literature by considering the strategic
3Kokko and Blomström (1995) show that formal technology transfer requirements are negatively related
to technology transfer.
4In Nigeria the Oil and Gas Reform Implementation Committee (OGIC) proposed a similar framework.
They recommended that the National Petroleum Asset Management Agency (NPAMA) should oversee in-
vestments by the state, while, The National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) would be active as a commercial
company (see Thurber and Istad, 2010).
5In Chinas automobile industry multinationals had 65.4 percent market share in the rst half of 2014.
In 2012 in the Pharmaceutical and in the Chemical industry of the Netherlands, the market share of foreign
companies was, respectively, 87.2 percent and 73.5 percent.
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interaction between multinationals when they set their level of technology transfer. Taking
this strategic interaction in technology transfer into account, generates results which are
more in line with empirical ndings, given that empirical studies also show an increase in
technology transfer by multinationals as local competition increases (see e.g. Kokko and
Blomström, 1995; Blomström et al., 1994).
The theoretical model by Wang and Blomström (1992) shows that as local rms increase
investment in learning, making the technology gap smaller, a multinational will transfer
more technology to its a¢ liate in the host country. While, Wang and Blomström (1992)
look at the e¤ect of local learning capabilities, we analyze the e¤ect of product market
competition from local rms on technology transfer by multinationals. Furthermore, they
consider only one multinational rm and do not take into account the strategic interaction
between multinationals when they transfer technology. Finally, they also do not consider
FDI crowding out e¤ects.
FDI crowding out e¤ects have been analyzed separately from technology transfer in a
small number of theoretical studies. Dri¢ eld and Hughes (2003) study the possibility of
FDI crowding out local rms in the domestic capital market. Barry et al. (2005) analyze
crowding out e¤ects in the labor market. Similar to our analyzes Markusen and Venables
(1999) consider crowding out e¤ects through product market competition. However, they
do not consider technology transfer by multinationals under di¤erent market structures.
An additional focus of the paper is on the e¤ects of foreign ownership restrictions. Lee
and Shy (1992) show that restrictions on foreign ownership reduce the quality of technology
transferred by foreign rms. Similarly, theoretical analysis in Javorcik and Saggi (2010) shows
that a foreign investor with higher quality technology is less likely to form a joint venture
and more likely to enter directly. However, these papers do not consider the relationship
between foreign ownership restrictions and FDI crowding out e¤ects, which is one of the
main focuses of the current study.
The next section outlines the model. Section 3 studies whether or not FDI displaces
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local rm output. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ect of local competition on foreign rm technol-
ogy transfer. Section 5 analyzes FDI policies by host country governments such as foreign
ownership restrictions. The nal section concludes.
2 Model
The model is based on the two-stage game adopted in the literature on the economics of R&D
where rst technology investment is chosen and afterwards rms compete in the product
market.6 One local (emerging market) rm (e) competes with n  1 multinational a¢ liates
(m).7 In the rst stage multinationals transfer technology, xm, to their a¢ liates in the host
country which reduces marginal cost of production c (0  c  a). The marginal cost of
multinationals reduces to cm = c   xm due to technology transfer. Technology transfer is
costly and the cost function of technology transfer has the standard quadratic form:
zm(xm) =
x2m
2
: (1)
This cost function implies diminishing returns to technology transfer and  = @2C=@x2.
Total and marginal cost of technology transfer both increase with  . Thus, the cost function
for technology transfer shifts up as  increases and  can be related to the level of the cost
of technology transfer (see Mattoo et al., 2004). Below we provide the backward induction
solution of the two stage game between n rms with quantity competition in the second
stage.
2.1 Product Market
Final stage quantity competition is between n   1 multinational a¢ liates and one local
company. The linear inverse demand function for the product is given by p = a (
n 1X
m=1
qm+qe).
6See e.g. Brander and Spencer (1983), dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien, Muller, and Zang
(1992), and Kamien and Zang (2000).
7Similar to Wang and Blomström, 1992 we abstain from looking at the mode of entry choice of foreign
rms. All foreign rms have entered the country directly.
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Where, p is the market price, a > 0, Qm =
n 1X
M=1
qm is total output of all the multinationals
operating in the host country and qe is output of the local rm. Hence, Q =
n 1X
m=1
qm + qe
denotes total output.
The prot function of a representative multinational, net of technology transfer cost, is
denoted by:
m(qm; q m; qe) = (a  qm   q m   qe   cm) qm, m 2 f1; :::; n  1g. (2)
Where, q m is the sum of outputs of all multinational a¢ liates other than rmm. The prot
function of the local rm is given by:
e(qe; qm; q m) =
 
a  qe  
n 1X
m=1
qm   c
!
qe: (3)
Di¤erentiating foreign rm prot in (2) with respect to qm gives:
a  2qm  
n 1X
j=1;j 6=m
qj   qe   c+ xm = 0; m 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (4)
In symmetric equilibrium
n 1X
m=1
qm = Qm. So, rewriting (4) gives
a  qm  Qm   qe   c+ xm = 0; m 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (5)
Now, taking summations and solving for total output of the multinationals implies:
Qm =
(n  1)(a  c)  (n  1)qe +
n 1X
m=1
xm
n
; m 2 f1; :::; n  1g. (6)
Plugging the best response function of the local rm and function for total output of the
multinationals into (5) and solving for qm gives:
qm =
a  c+ 2(n  1)xm   2
n 1X
j=1;j 6=m
xj
n+ 1
, m 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (7)
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Output of a foreign rm increases with its own technology transfer and decreases with tech-
nology transfer of competing rms. Plugging (7) into the best response function for the local
rm in symmetric equilibrium gives:
qe =
a  c 
n 1X
m=1
xM
n+ 1
: (8)
Technology transfer by foreign multinationals enhances competitiveness of multinational
subsidiaries and therefore reduces output of the local rm.
2.2 Technology transfer
From (2) and (7) it follows that for a representative multinational the prot net of technology
transfer cost can be expressed as q2m. So, the equilibrium level of technology transfer by a
representative multinational can be obtained by optimizing q2m(xm)  x
2
m
2
, m 2 f1; :::; n 1g.
This gives
xm =
4(n  1)(a  c)
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) ; m 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (9)
Consequently, the total transfer of technology is given by
Xm =
4(n  1)2(a  c)
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) : (10)
In line with previous research, see e.g. Mattoo et al. (2004), we impose certain restrictions
on parameter  , i.e.  > 1.8 Foreign rms transfer less technology to the host country as
the cost of technology transfer () increases. Moreover, technology transfer increases with n
for relevant parameter values.9
3 Does FDI crowd out local rms?
Crowding out e¤ects from FDI on domestic investment occur when multinational companies
prevent market entry by local rms or induce local rms to exit the market. By substituting
8This restriction ensures non-negative solutions for equilibrium levels of technology transfer under all
relevant regimes.
9See Appendix 1 for detailed analysis.
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the level of technology transfer of a representative multinational in (9) into the output
function of the local rm in (8) we obtain local rm equilibrium output:10
qe =
(a  c)[(n+ 1)   4(n  1)]
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) . (11)
If the the local rm is active in the market i.e. qe > 0, local rm output increases with 
and decreases with n (see Appendix 4). So, there will be some displacement of local rm
investment as the number of foreign rms increases. Analysis of expression (11) implies the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 FDI fully displaces the local rm if   E(n), where
E(n) =
4(n  1)
n+ 1
: (12)
Furthermore, E(n) increases with n and approaches 4 as n approaches innity.
Proof. For detailed proof see Appendix 3.
This proposition implies that, if  > 4 the local rm is active in the market irrespective
of the number of multinationals. Hence, for su¢ ciently high  , FDI does not completely
displace the local rm. The solid EMF curve in Fig. 1 illustrates the E(n) threshold for
 < 4. Where, EMF stands for emerging market rm. For all combinations of n and  on the
EMF locus and all combinations of n and  under the locus there is complete displacement
of the local rm by FDI. For all combinations above this locus FDI does not completely
displace the local rm. In section 5 we derive the threshold depicted by the FIP locus.
For all values under the FIP locus domestic welfare decreases with the number of foreign
multinationals and domestic welfare increases with the number of foreign multinationals for
all values above the locus. We will now focus on crowding out e¤ects i.e. the EMF locus.
Fig. 1 is divided into three regions, I, II and III. n regions I and II, FDI there is full
(100%) displacement of the local rm (i.e. qe = 0). This happens in case of low cost of
technology transfer and a relatively large number of foreign multinationals in the market.
10Detailed derivations of equilibrium outputs and prots are provided in Appendix 2.
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On the other hand, in region III, where the the cost of technology transfer () is su¢ ciently
high and a small number of foreign multinationals is active in the market, FDI does not
completely displace the local rm.
To understand the intuition of this result recall from (9) that a reduction in  improves the
incentives for transferring technology. Also, from (8) it follows that lower technology transfer
improves the competitive position of the local rm. As a result complete displacement of
the local rm becomes less likely, when technology transfer by multinationals becomes more
costly, i.e. when  increases. Cost of technology transfer are higher in less advanced countries
(see e.g. Teece, 1977; Ramachandran, 1993). Hence, full displacement of local rms due
to product market competition from multinationals will less likely occur in less advanced
countries. Similarly, empirical analyzes by Blonigen and Wang (2004) and by Borensztein
et al. (1998) do not nd FDI crowding out e¤ects in developing countries. Furthermore,
Blonigen and Wang (2004) do nd crowding out e¤ects in advanced countries.11
Figure 1: FDI, local investment, and FDI policy.
In addition, our framework also allows to address a di¤erent issue where a multinational
emerging market rm decides to enter a foreign market, which is dominated by companies
11Borensztein et al. (1998) do not look at advanced countries.
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from advanced nations. Emerging markets rms are increasingly investing overseas.12 More
than one-third of FDI in developing countries originates in other developing economies.13 Of-
ten mentioned reasons for why emerging market rms mainly enter other developing countries
are cultural and geographic proximity (see e.g. Wells, 1983; Buckley et al., 2007). We provide
a new rationale for higher investments by emerging market rms in less developed countries
which is the higher cost of technology transfer in these nations. In case of higher cost of
technology transfer an emerging market rm more easily competes with rms from advanced
countries due to lower technology transfer by the latter. As a result emerging market rms
are more willing to enter other developing countries than entering more advanced countries.
4 E¤ect of local competition on technology transfer
If the local rm is fully displaced by FDI, then, only foreign multinationals will be active.
Hence, in the product market there is no competition from a local rm anymore, i.e. qe = 0.
Local rm output qe = 0, so, Q =
n 1X
m=1
qm denotes total output. When, there is no local rm
in the market, the prot function of a representative multinational net of technology transfer
cost is denoted by:
NLCm (qm; q m) = (a  qm   q m   cm) qm, m 2 f1; :::; n  1g. (13)
Where, NLC stands for no local competition. Optimizing the prot function with respect
to output and rewriting gives:
a  qm  Q  c+ xm = 0; m 2 f1; :::; n  1g. (14)
Next, assuming symmetric equilibrium, taking summations and solving for total output
implies:
QNLC =
(n  1)(a  c) +
n 1X
m=1
xm
n
: (15)
12In 2013 developing countries together made up 32.2 percent of total world FDI outows. See World
Investment Report 2014 UNCTAD.
13See World Bank Global Development Horizons, 2011.
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Plugging (15) in (14) gives:
qNLCm =
a  c+ (n  1)xm  
n 1X
j=1;j 6=m
xj
n
; m 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (16)
Output of a foreign rm increases with its own technology transfer and decreases with tech-
nology transfer by competing rms.
In the rst stage, when a representative multinational sets the level of technology transfer,
it maximizes NLCm (xm)   x
2
m
2
. Optimizing with respect to xm and assuming symmetry in
equilibrium gives the optimal level of technology transfer by a representative foreign rm.14
xNLCm =
2(n  1)(a  c)
n2   2n+ 2 ; m 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (17)
Multiplying the level of technology transfer with the number of multinationals operating in
the given country (n  1) gives the total technology transfer to the host country.
XNLCm =
2(n  1)2(a  c)
n2   2n+ 2 : (18)
Total technology transfer decreases with the cost of technology transfer () and increases
with the number of foreign multinational rms in the market (n).15
The e¤ect of local competition on technology transfer by multinationals can be obtained
by comparing the level of technology transfer when the local rm is active in the market
with the level of technology transfer when the local rm is not active in the market (due
to crowding out e¤ects). Comparing the level of technology transfer in case of no local
competition in (18) with the level technology transfer under competition from a local rm
in (10) implies the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) When n = 2, local competition enhances technology transfer by MNCs if
 < 4.
(ii) When n  3, local competition always enhances technology transfer by MNCs (for all
levels of ).
14Recall that restriction  > 1 ensures non-negative solutions for all n  2.
15See Appendix 1 for detailed analysis.
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Proof. For detailed proof see Appendix 5.
From (i) it follows that if only one multinational is active in the market and  > 4 this
multinational will transfer more technology to the host country if the multinational a¢ liate
does not have to compete with a local rm. From proposition 1 we know the local rm will
not be fully displaced in case of  > 4 and there will be competition from the local rm.
From (ii) it follows that in case there are several rms in the market, then, competition from
a local rm increases technology transfer by foreign multinationals irrespective of the level
of  . This implies that if FDI is prevented from displacing the local rm, then, technology
transfer by foreign multinationals will increase.
From (7) and (8) it follows that by transferring more technology a multinational increases
the output of its a¢ liate and lowers the output of competing rms including that of the local
rm. As a result by transferring technology a multinational will increases the prot of its
a¢ liate. This is the so called strategic e¤ect of technology transfer (see Brander and Spencer,
1983). This e¤ect is stronger when the multinational a¢ liate also has to compete with a
local rm. Furthermore, the higher the output of a foreign rm, the higher its incentive to
invest in technology, this is the so called scale e¤ect (see Mattoo et al., 2004). Foreign rm
output is lower under local competition as more rms will be in the market. As a result
the scale e¤ect is stronger when the local rm is not active in the market. For n  3 the
strategic e¤ect outweighs the scale e¤ect and technology transfer under local competition is
always higher than technology transfer under no local competition. For n = 2 the scale e¤ect
outweighs the strategic e¤ect when  is su¢ ciently large. In this case technology transfer is
higher in the absence of local competition.
Mattoo et al. (2004) show that an increase in the number of local rms leads to lower
technology transfer by a foreign multinational. However, the current results show an increase
in technology transfer due to local competition, for every level of  in competitive markets
and in monopolistic markets in case of su¢ ciently low  . The current results are more in line
with empirical ndings. Blomström et al. (1994) analyzing FDI in Mexican manufacturing
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industries show that local competition is positively related to technology imports by foreign
owned a¢ liates. Furthermore, Kokko and Blomström (1995) found that US rms transferred
more technology to host countries as local competition increased.
5 Host Country Welfare
Di¤erent FDI policy measures are used in practice. In order to prevent foreign rms from
crowding-out local rms, governments may restrict foreign direct investment by, for example,
restricting the number of foreign rms allowed to enter the host country. Furthermore, in
order to obtain higher rents from foreign rm prots, the government may restrict foreign
ownership. This can be done either directly or by imposing on foreign rms that they form a
joint venture with a local company. In the following sub-sections we discuss these two types
of foreign ownership restrictions.
First, we analyze the objective of the host country government based on host country
welfare. Host country welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and local rm prot. Host
country welfare when the local rm is active in the market and welfare when FDI displaces
the local rm are, respectively, given by:
W =
(qe + (n  1)qm)2
2
+ e and WNLC =
((n  1)qNLCm )2
2
. (19)
In Appendix 6 it is shown that welfare always increases with the number of multinationals
(n) if the local rm is active in the market. If the local rm is displaced by FDI the derivative
of host country welfare w.r.t. the number of multinational rms is given by:
@WNLC
@n
=
 n 2 (a  c)2 (n  1) (2n2   n2   4n+ 2)
(n2   2n+ 2)3 (20)
Analysis of (20) shows that restricting the number of foreign rms in the host country,
enhances host country welfare if @W
NLC
@n
< 0. This proofs the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Restricting the number of foreign multinationals increases welfare if  
W (n), where
W (n; ) =
2 (n  1)2
n2
. (21)
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Furthermore, W (n) increases with n and approaches 2 as n approaches innity.
This proposition implies that restricting the number of multinationals may increase host
country welfare if the cost of technology transfer () is su¢ ciently low. Threshold W (n; )
is depicted in Figure 1 by the FIP locus, where, FIP stands for foreign investment policy.
For all values under the locus welfare decreases with the number of foreign multinationals
in the host country. For all values above the locus host country welfare increases with the
number of foreign multinational rms in the market.
Hence, in Fig. 1 in region I the local rm is fully displaced and host country welfare
decreases with n. In region II the local rm is also displaced by FDI, but host country
welfare increases with n. In region III the local rm is not displaced by FDI and welfare
increases with the number of foreign multinational rms. From Propositions 1 it can be seen
that in case of a smaller number of foreign rms in the market, FDI will less likely displace
the local rm. Hence, host country governments may restrict the number of multinationals
in the market in order to prevent crowding out e¤ects. This provides a possible rationale
for the often used FDI policy measure of limiting the number of foreign rms. For example,
in South Korea the government successfully limited FDI in high technology sectors in order
to nurture local rms (see e.g. Wade, 1990). From proposition 3 it follows, however, that
this policy of nurturing local rms will reduce host country welfare in countries where the
cost of technology transfer is not su¢ ciently low. Besides restricting the number of foreign
rms, host country governments often apply foreign ownership restrictions, which will be
addressed in the next subsection.
5.1 Foreign ownership restrictions
The most obvious restriction on foreign direct investment is the restriction on foreign own-
ership. Foreign ownership restrictions are a common practice in developing countries, and
emerging market economies such as Brazil, Indonesia, and India. These countries restrict
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foreign ownership in a wide span of industries.16 In developed countries foreign ownership
restrictions are being imposed less often but are still present in di¤erent industries.17The
government can directly restrict foreign ownership. In Norways oil and gas industry, for
example, the state takes a share of ownership through the so called States Direct Financial
Interest (SDFI) portfolio. The government may also demand that multinationals form joint
ventures with local companies. In Nigeria, international oil companies are obliged to form
joint ventures with the national oil company. The national oil company has an ownership
share of 55-60 percent. We now assume the government imposes foreign ownership restric-
tions and the share of foreign ownership is  with 0 <  < 1. Hence, the prot function of
the multinationals, now, will also depend on the share of foreign ownership. When, FDI dis-
places the local rm and there is no local competition, technology transfer by a representative
multinational is denoted by xNLCm ()  arg maxfNLCm (xm)  x
2
m
2
g.18
Under local competition the solution of the game under direct foreign ownership restric-
tions di¤ers from the solution under restrictions through joint ventures. First, we consider
direct foreign ownership restrictions by the government. Second, we consider the case of
foreign ownership restrictions by imposing joint ventures with the local rm.
5.1.1 Direct restrictions by the government
Equilibrium level of technology transfer by a representative foreign rm under direct foreign
ownership restrictions is denoted by xDRm ()  arg maxfm(xm)   x
2
m
2
g (see Appendix
7). Where, DR means direct foreign ownership restrictions. By substituting this level of
technology transfer into the function for local rm output in (8), we obtain the equilibrium
output of the emerging market rm. We need to obtain the equilibrium output of the local
rm in order to see whether crowding out e¤ects from FDI increase or decrease due to foreign
16In India the limit of foreign ownership in insurance, is recently raised from 26 percent to 49 percent.
In Chinas automobile industry, international car manufacturers can have an ownership share of up to 50
percent.
17In the airline industry foreign rms can own 49 percent in the European Union and 25 percent in the
USA. In Japans telecommunications sector foreign rm ownership is limited to 33 percent.
18Detailed derivations when foreign ownership is restricted and the local rm is displaced by FDI are
provided in Appendix 7.
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ownership restrictions. Output of the emerging market rm is:
qDRe () =
(a  c)[(n+ 1)   4(n  1)]
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) : (22)
The local rm will be active in the market if qDRe () > 0. Threshold 
E(n) in (12) is now
multiplied by the share of foreign ownership, , i.e. ER(n; ) = 4(n 1)
n+1
is increasing in
. Hence, in terms of Figure 1 lower foreign ownership shares () shift the EMF curve
downwards (see locus EMF (DR) in Figure 2). This implies that the region in which FDI
does not fully displace the local rm expands. This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Due to direct foreign ownership restrictions the possible crowding out e¤ects
of FDI will be reduced.
The intuition for the above result is based on the fact that higher foreign ownership
restrictions create an improvement in the competitive position of the local rm relative
to foreign companies. This, in turn, makes it less likely that the local rm will exit the
market due to FDI. Often suggested reasons for foreign ownership restrictions are that host
country governments use them to increase rents and to maintain local control of resources.
In addition, Mattoo et al. (2004) show that a host country government may impose foreign
ownership restrictions in order to inuence the entry choice of a foreign rm.19 We show that,
besides these often mentioned reasons, the government may impose restrictions on foreign
ownership in order to prevent FDI from displacing the local rm.
However, governments should take into account that these restrictions on foreign owner-
ship also reduce technology transfer by foreign multinationals (as xDRm () is increasing in ,
see Appendix 7). This in turn will reduce the scope for FDI technology spillovers and sub-
sequent crowding in e¤ects. Moreover, these foreign ownership restrictions will also reduce
host country welfare.20
19Mattoo et al. (2004) show that in case of high cost of technology transfer the government imposes
restrictions in order to induce acquisition instead of direct entry. While, in case of low cost of technology
transfer the government imposes restrictions in order to induce direct entry instead of acquisition.
20For detailed derivations see Appendix 7.
15
5.1.2 Restrictions by imposing joint ventures with the local rm
In practice foreign rms often have to form joint ventures with local companies. Now, we
consider a host country government that imposes on n  1 multinational a¢ liates that they
form a joint venture with the local rm. The local rm chooses whether it also wants to enter
the market by starting its wholly-owned operations in which case there will be n companies
active in the market: n 1 joint ventures and one local rm. If the local rm does not enter,
its payo¤ will be: (n  1)(1  )NLCm (). Prot of a foreign company when there is no local
competition (NLCm ()) is provided in Appendix 7. The local rm chooses to establish its
wholly-owned operations if:
e  (n  1)(1  )JVm () + JVe ()  (n  1)(1  )NLCm () > 0. (23)
Where, JV stands for foreign ownership restrictions by imposing joint ventures. Derivations
in case of entry by the local rm are provided in Appendix 8. It follows that the expression for
e is quite cumbersome and non-linear in  , , and n. However, dividing e by (a  c)2
and xing  allows for convenient graphical analysis in (n,) space. The contour of the
function e=(a  c)2 = 0 is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the EMF (JV ) locus (for  = 0:5). For
all values of n and  on the EMF (JV ) curve the local rm is indi¤erent between entering
and not entering. In the (n, ) parameter space under the EMF (JV ) locus, the local rm
prefers entering (regions I and II) and above the locus the local rm prefers not to enter
(regions III and IV). Furthermore, higher restrictions on foreign ownership, a decrease in
, shifts the EMF (JV ) locus in Figure 2 upwards. This implies that entry becomes more
likely as foreign ownership restrictions increase.
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Figure 2: Local rm investment under di¤erent types of foreign ownership restrictions
5.1.3 Welfare under the two types of foreign ownership restrictions
Imposing on all foreign companies that they form a joint venture with the same local rm,
closely resembles the extractive industry in a number of countries. In other industries more
than one local rmmay be active in the market and foreign multinationals form joint ventures
with di¤erent local rms (see e.g. automobile industry in China). In extractive industries
such as the oil & gas sector, typically a small number of rms is active in the market, hence,
region where JVe < 0 and the local rm only takes joint venture shares but does not
enter the market. In this region where JVe < 0 host country welfare is given by W
JV ()
if foreign ownership is restricted through joint venture. If foreign ownership is directly
restricted, welfare will be given by W (), where,
W JV () =
[(n  1)qNLCm ()]2
2
+ (1  )(n  1)NLCm () and (24)
W () =
[(n  1)qm() + qe()]2
2
+ e()
The host country government improves welfare by restricting foreign ownership directly
instead of through joint venture if the following inequality holds.
W () = W () W JV () > 0 (25)
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Graphical analysis of the above inequality is possible by dividing W () by (a   c)2 and
xing . The WW locus in Fig. 2 shows the contour of the function W ()=(a   c)2
= 0 when  = 0:5. In region III welfare is higher under joint venture foreign ownership
restrictions and in region IV welfare is higher under direct foreign ownership restrictions.
Hence, in region IV, the government can improve welfare by taking away local rm joint
venture ownership shares and directly control these equity shares as in section 5.1.1.21 The
latter policy measure would mean that the relevant threshold changes from EMF (JV ) to
EMF (DR) and welfare increases in region IV where cost of technology transfer are high
and there is a small number of rms in the market (e.g. natural resource sectors). This
provides a possible rationale for a policy measure taken by the Norwegian government in the
oil & gas sector. In the 1980s the government took away joint ventrue ownership shares of
the national oil company and started to manage these shares directly through the Ministry
of Oil and Energy. The Nigerian Oil and Gas Reform Implementation Committee (OGIC)
proposed a similar framework for Nigerias oil & gas sector.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed whether FDI crowds out local rms and whether technology
transfer by multinationals increases with local competition. We found that in less developed
countries FDI will not fully displace local rms, while, in more advanced countries this may
happen. Empirical studies by e.g. Blonigen and Wang (2004) and Borensztein et al. (1998)
also show that FDI will not fully crowd-out local rms in developing countries. This seems
counterintuitive as one would expect that multinationals will more easily outcompete local
rms in developing countries than in more advanced countries. We provide a possible expla-
nation for this seemingly counterintuitive result, through the cost of technology transfer. Due
to higher cost of technology transfer in less developed countries (see e.g. Teece, 1977; Ra-
machandran, 1993) multinational corporations transfer less technology to their subsidiaries
21The government can establish a department to manage these ownership shares, whereby, it separates
the local rm from government interest in the industry.
18
in these countries. This lower transfer of technology by multinational corporations in less
developed countries will reduce the competitive pressure on local rms and prevent the local
rm from being fully displaced by FDI. This may also explain why most outward greeneld
investment by emerging market rms is done in other developing countries instead of in more
advanced countries where cost of technology transfer are low. In the latter case emerging
market rms may not be able to compete with technologically more advanced rms.
Furthermore, we found that in competitive markets, multinationals will transfer more
technology to their a¢ liates if they have to compete with a local rm. When, one considers a
market with only one multinational a¢ liate that competes with a number of local rms, such
as in e.g. Mattoo et al. (2004), then, local competition will reduce multinational technology
transfer. However, in most industries a multinational subsidiary not only competes with
local rms but also with other multinational a¢ liates that also import technology from
multinational headquarters. We extend the existing framework by considering strategic
interaction between a number of foreign multinationals, in both the product market stage and
the technology transfer stage. In line with our ndings, empirical results by e.g. Blomström
et al. (1994) indeed show that local competition leads to an increase in technology transfer
by multinational enterprizes.
Some host country governments restrict the number of foreign multinationals in the host
country in order to protect local rms. While, this policy measure may reduce crowding
out e¤ects, we nd that it also reduces host country welfare in less advanced countries.
Another policy measure often imposed is the restriction on foreign ownership shares. In
extractive industries foreign multinationals often have to form a joint venture with a national
resource rm. Instead of imposing joint ventures, the government may also choose to directly
restrict foreign ownership, whereby, it separates the local rm from government interest in
the industry. A similar measure was taken in 1984 by the Norwegian government. The
government took away signicant ownership shares from the local company Statoil. The
government started to manage these equity shares which it calls States Direct Financial
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Interest (SDFI) through the Ministry of Oil and Energy.22 Taking such a policy measure
is in line with our theoretical nding which shows that the government may improve host
country welfare by taking away local rm equity shares in joint ventures.
Hence, this paper shows that local competition is likely to enhance technology transfer
by foreign multinationals. As a result policies that stimulate market entry by local rms may
provide a policy alternative to formal performance and technology transfer requirements.23
By increasing technology transfer through local competition, host country governments may
enhance the scope for technology spill-overs. Furthermore, it is shown that FDI is less
likely to fully crowd-out local investment in less developed countries. In these countries FDI
restrictions may further reduce crowding-out e¤ects. However, restricting the number of
foreign multinationals and restricting foreign ownership will also lower host country welfare.
Hence, host country governments considering FDI restrictions in order to protect local rms
should take these e¤ects on host country welfare into account.
We also nd that in developed countries FDI will likely crowd-out local investment.
However, the static framework that we apply does not allow to analyze long-run e¤ects from
FDI on local investment. Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) analyzing Belgium manufacturing
companies show that FDI displaces local investment in the short-run, but in the long-run
this e¤ect is moderated or even reversed. Hence, also in more advanced countries crowding
out e¤ects may be prevented. Considering long-run e¤ects of FDI on domestic investment
is beyond the scope of our model and should be addressed in further research.24
22Since 2001 Petoro a state holding company manages the governments interest. Statoil is responsible for
selling Petoros share of oil and gas but the revenue gos to the state.
23Also pointed out by Kokko and Blomström (1995).
24Theoretical model by Markusen and Venables (1999) shows that FDI benets local investment through
backward-forward linkages. Through backward linkages local upstream rms benet from FDI and then in
turn through forward linkages local downstream rms benet also.
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Appendix 1: Technology transfer
The derivatives of technology transfer w.r.t. the number of rms in the market (n) under no
competition from the local rm and under competition from the local rm are respectively:
@Xm
@n
=
16 (a  c) (n  1) (   2n+ n + 2)
(   8n+ 2n + n2 + 8)2 and
@XNLCm
@n
=
4 (a  c) (n  1) (n   n+ 1)
(n2   2n+ 2)2 :
(26)
If the local rm is not displaced by FDI, qE > 0, technology transfer (Xm) increases with
n if  > TT (n), where TT (n) = 2(n 1)
n+1
. We will show later in the proof of proposition 1
that if  < TT (n) we have qE = 0. When qE = 0 the relevant level of technology transfer
is XNLCm . From (26) it follows that technology transfer when there is no local rm in the
market (XNLCm ), increases with the number of foreign multinationals, when n  2 and  > 1.
Hence, technology transfer by multinationals increases with n when FDI crowds the local
rm out and also when FDI does not crowd the local rm out.
Appendix 2: Equilibrium outputs and prots
1. Derivations for the case without competition from the local rm
By substituting (17) into (16) we obtain the equilibrium output of any given foreign rm
in the host country:
qNLCm =
(a  c)n
n2   2n+ 2 . (27)
Equilibrium prot of a foreign rm is given by:
NLCm =
(a  c)2 (n2   2n2 + 4n  2)
(n2   2n+ 2)2 (28)
2. Derivations for Competition from emerging market rm case
By substituting (9) into (7) and into (8) we obtain output of any given advanced rm in
the host country and output of the local rm:
qm =
(a  c)(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) and qe =
(a  c)((n+ 1)   4(n  1))
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) (29)
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Equilibrium prot of a foreign rm and of the local rm are, respectively, given by:
m =
(a  c)2((n+ 1)2   4(n  1)2)
((n+ 1)2   8(n  1))2 and e =
(a  c)2((n+ 1)   4(n  1))2
((n+ 1)2   8(n  1))2 : (30)
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
The local rm will be active in the market if qe > 0. Restriction on  > 1 ensures that
denominator of the expression is positive. Hence, we need to ensure only (n+1) 4(n 1) >
0: This implies that FDI will not fully displace the local rm if parameter  is su¢ ciently
high, i.e.  > E(n) = 4(n 1)
n+1
. This proves the rst part of Proposition 1. Furthermore,
limn!1
4(n 1)
n+1
= 4. Finally, @
E(n)
@n
= 8
(n+1)2
> 0: This proves the second part of Proposition
1.
Appendix 4: Comparative statics of local rm output
The derivative of local rm output w.r.t. n and  is, respectively, given by:
@qe
@n
=
 (a  c) (8n+  + 2n + n2   4n2   4)
(   8n+ 2n + n2 + 8)2 and
@qe
@
=
(n+ 1)4 (a  c) (n  1)2
(   8n+ 2n + n2 + 8)2 > 0
(31)
It follows that local rm output decreases with n if  > DR where DR = 4(n 1)
2
(n+1)2
. From
the proof of proposition 1 it follows that qe > 0 if  >
4(n 1)
n+1
. Since, DR < 4(n 1)
n+1
local rm
output decreases with n for qe > 0.
Appendix 5: Proof of Propositions 2
Foreign rms transfer more technology under local competition than under no local compe-
tition i¤:
X  X  XNLC = 4(n  1)
2(a  c)
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1)  
2(n  1)2(a  c)
n2   2n+ 2 > 0 or (32)
X =
2(n  1)2(a  c) [(n2   2n  1) + 4n  4]
(n2   2n+ 2)((n+ 1)2   8(n  1)) > 0: (33)
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Recall  > 1 and n  2 > 0, hence, the above inequality implies that X > 0 if (n2  2n 
1) + 4n  4 > 0. We can conclude that
 < 4(n 1)
2n+1 n2 ; when n  1 +
p
2  2:4
 > 4(n 1)
2n+1 n2 ; when n > 1 +
p
2  2:4
This also shows that, when 0 < n < 1 +
p
2, T (n) = 4(n 1)
2n+1 n2 > 0: Hence, technology
transfer is higher under local competition if
 < T (n) =
4(n  1)
2n+ 1  n2 : (34)
Note that for n = 2, T (n) = 4. This implies the result in part (i) of proposition 2.
Furthermore, when n > 1+
p
2  2:4; T (n) = 4(n 1)
2n+1 n2 < 0: Hence, for n > 1+
p
2 technology
transfer is always higher under local competition for any  > 1. T (n) is depicted by the
solid loci TT in Figure 3. This completes the proof of proposition 2.
Figure 3: E¤ect of local competition on technology transfer
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 3
Host country welfare when the local rm is active in the market is:
W = CS(Q) + e =
(a  p)Q
2
+ e
W =
(a  (a  qe   (n  1)qm))(qe + (n  1)qm)
2
+ e =
(qe + (n  1)qm)2
2
+ e(35)
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This implies:
W =
(a  c)2((n+ 1)n  4(n  1))2
2((n+ 1)2   8(n  1))2 +
(a  c)2((n+ 1)   4(n  1))2
((n+ 1)2   8(n  1))2 : (36)
Host country welfare increases with the number of foreign multinational rms if @W
@n
> 0,
where
@W
@n
=
 (a c)2( n42+4n4 n32 16n3+16n3+3n22 48n2+5n2+16n+48n+22 4 16)
( 8n+2n+n2+8)3
Graphical analysis of the function (@W
@n
)=(a  c)2 = 0 is provided in Fig. 4 in (n,)-space,
where, it is depicted by the locus @W=@n = 0. It can be seen that welfare increases with n
when qe > 0,  > 1, and n > 2.
Figure 4: FDI and host country welfare
When, the local rm is displaced by foreign multinationals (qe = 0), welfare is given by
WNLC =
(a  (a  (n  1)qNLCm )(n  1)qNLCm
2
=
(n  1)2(a  c)2n2 2
2(n2   2n+ 2)2 (37)
Appendix 7: Derivations under foreign ownership re-
strictions
1. Derivations for the case with no local rm in the market
Maximizing: m(xm)  x2m2 , m 2 f1; :::; n  1g, gives foreign rm technology transfer:
xNLCm () =
2(n  1)(a  c)
n2   2(n  1) : (38)
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Foreign rm equilibrium output, qNLCm (), is found by plugging technology transfer in (38)
into (16) and assuming symmetry in equilibrium:
qNLCm () =
(a  c)n
n2   2(n  1) . (39)
It follows that the prot function of a representative foreign rm net of technology transfer
cost is given by:
NLCm () = [
(a  c)n
n2   2(n  1)]
2. (40)
Welfare is now given by:
WNLC() =
(n  1)2(a  c)2n2 2
2(n2   2(n  1))2 (41)
It follows from (41) that welfare decreases with foreign equity restrictions i.e. a decrease in
.
2. Derivations for the case the local rm is active in the market and direct
foreign ownership restrictions
Maximizing: m(xm)  x2m2 , m 2 f1; :::; n  1g, gives technology transfer by a represen-
tative multinational:
xDRm () =
4(n  1)(a  c)
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) (42)
By substituting (42) into functions for output in (7) and (8), we obtain the equilibrium
output of, respectively, a foreign multinational and the local rm:
qDRm () =
(a  c)(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) and q
DR
e () =
(a  c)[(n+ 1)   4(n  1)]
(n+ 1)2   8(n  1) . (43)
This implies
DRe () =
(a  c)2[(n+ 1)   4(n  1)]2
[(n+ 1)2   8(n  1)]2 and 
DR
m () =
(a  c)2[(n+ 1)2   8(n  1)2]
[(n+ 1)2   8(n  1)]2 :
Host country welfare is given by
W () =
(a  c)[((n+ 1)n   4(n  1))2 + 2((n+ 1)   4(n  1))2]
2[(n+ 1)2   8(n  1)]2
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The derivative of host country welfare w.r.t. foreign ownership is:
@W ()
@
=
 4 (a  c) (n  1)2 (n+ 1) (4 + 2   4n + n   n2)
(8 +    8n + 2n + n2)3
Host country welfare decreases with foreign ownership if: 4 + 2   4n + n   n2 > 0.
Given that inequality (n+2 n
2)
4(n 1) > 1 does not hold, welfare increases with .
Appendix 8: Derivations entry under joint venture regime
In this appendix we provide detailed derivations of the expressions under the joint venture
regime for the case of entry by the local rm. Under entry, the best response function of the
local rm is obtained by di¤erentiating the following objective function:
max
qe
(n  1)(1  )m(qe; qm) + e(qe; qm) which is equivalent to (44)
max
qe
(n  1)(1  )
 
a  qe  
n 1X
m=1
qm   cm
!
qm +
 
a  qe  
n 1X
m=1
qm   c
!
qe: (45)
Plugging the best response function of the local rm and function for total output of foreign
rms in (6) into (5) and solving for qm implies:
qJVm () =
a  c+ 2(n  1)xm   2
n 1X
j=1;j 6=m
xj
2 + (n  1) , m 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (46)
Plugging (46) into the best response function of the local rm in symmetric equilibrium
gives:
qJVe () =
(a  c)(2  n+ (n  1))  (2  )
n 1X
m=1
xm
2 + (n  1) . (47)
From (2) and (46) it follows that for a representative multinational from an advanced country,
the prot net of cost of technology transfer can be expressed as (qLCJVm ())
2. Hence, foreign
rm technology transfer under entry is given by:
xJVm () =
4(n  1)(a  c)
(2 + (n  1))2   8(n  1) : (48)
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Plugging value for technology transfer in (48) under entry into expressions for output in (46)
and (47) gives equilibrium output of, respectively, a foreign rm and of the local rm:
qJVm () =
(a  c)(2 + (n  1))
(2 + (n  1))2   8(n  1) and (49)
qJVe () =
(a  c)((2  n+ (n  1))(2 + (n  1))   4(n  1))
(2 + (n  1))2   8(n  1) (50)
This implies that:
JVm () = [
(a  c)(2 + (n  1))
(2 + (n  1))2   8(n  1)]
2 and (51)
JVe () = [
(a  c)((2  n+ (n  1))(2 + (n  1))   4(n  1))
(2 + (n  1))2   8(n  1) ]
2 (52)
References
[1] Agosin, M. R. and R. Machado (2005). Foreign Investment in Developing Countries:
Does it Crowd in Domestic Investment?. Oxford Development Studies, 33. 2, 149-
162.
[2] Asiedu, E. and H. S. Esfahani (2001). Ownership Structure in Foreign Direct Investment
Projects. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83, 64762.
[3] Backer, K. de and L. Sleuwaegen (2003). Does Foreign Direct Investment crowd out
domestic entrepreneurship? Review of Industrial Organization, 22, 67-84.
[4] Barry, F., H. Görg, and E. Strobl (2005). Foreign direct investment and wages in do-
mestic rms in Ireland: productivety spillovers versus labour market crowding out.
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 12, 1, 67-84.
[5] Blomström, M., A. Kokko, and M. Zejan (1994). Host Country Competition, Labor
Skills, and Technology Transfer by Multinationals. Review of World Economics,
130, 521-533.
27
[6] Blomström, M., and F. Sjoholm (1999). Technology Transfer and Spillovers: Does Local
Participation with Multinationals Matter? European Economic Review, 43, 91523.
[7] Blomström, M., and A. Kokko (1998). Multinational corporations and spillovers. Journal
of Economic Surveys, 12(3), 247277.
[8] Blonigen, B. A., and M. Wang (2004). Inappropriate pooling of wealthy and poor coun-
tries in empirical FDI studies. NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 10378.
[9] Borensztein, E., J. De Gregorio, and J.-W. Lee (1998). How does foreign direct invest-
ment a¤ect economic growth? Journal of International Economics, 45, 115-135.
[10] Brander, J. A., and B. J. Spencer (1983). Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Sym-
metric Case. Bell Journal of Economics, 14(1), 225-235.
[11] Buckley, P. J., L. J. Clegg, A. R. Cross, X. Liu, H. Voss, and P. Zheng (2007). The
determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment. Journal of International
Business Studies, 38, 499-518.
[12] dAspremont, C., and A. Jacquemin (1988). Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in
Duopoly with Spillovers. The American Economic Review, 78, 5, 1133-37.
[13] Dri¢ eld, N. and D. Hughes (2010). Foreign and domestic investment: regional develop-
ment or crowding out? Regional studies, 37, 3, 277-288.
[14] Crespo, N. and M. Fontoura (2007). Determinant factors of FDI spillovers - What do
we really know? World Development, 35, 3, 410-25.
[15] De Backer, K. and L. Sleuwaegen (2003). Does foreign direct investment crowd out
domestic entrepreneurship. Review of Industrial Organization, 22, 1, 67-84.
[16] Ethier, W.J. and J. R. Markusen (1996). Multinational rms, technology di¤usion and
trade. Journal of International Economics, 41, 1-28.
[17] Fosfuri, A., M. Motta, and T. Ronde (2001). Foreign direct investment and spillovers
through workers mobility. Journal of International Economics, 53, 1, 205-222.
28
[18] Javorcik, B.S. and K. Saggi (2010). Technological asymmetry among foreign investors
and mode of entry. Economic Inquiry, 48, 2, 415-433.
[19] Kamien, M. I., E. Muller, and I. Zang (1992). Research Joint Ventures and R&DCartels.
American Economic Review, 82, 5, 1293-306.
[20] Kamien, M. I. and I. Zang (2000). Meet me halfway: research joint ventures and ab-
sorptive capacity. International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 18, 995-1012.
[21] Kokko, A. andM. Blomström (1995). Policies to encourage inows of technology through
foreign multinationals. World Development, 23, 3, 459-468.
[22] Lee, F. C. and O. Shy (1992). A welfare evaluation of technology transfer to joint
ventures in the developing countries. The International Trade Journal, 2, 205-220.
[23] Markusen, J.R. (1995). The boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of
international trade. The Journal of Economics Perspectives, 9, 2, 169189.
[24] Markusen, J.R. (2001). Contracts, intellectual property rights, and multinational in-
vestment in developing countries. Journal of International Economics, 53, 189204.
[25] Markusen, J. R., and A. J. Venables (1998). Multinational rms and the new trade
theory. Journal of International Economics, 46, 183-203.
[26] Markusen, J. R., and A. J. Venables (1999). Foreign direct investment as a catalyst for
industrial development. European Economic Review, 43, 2, 15, 335-356.
[27] Mattoo, A., M. Olarreaga, and K. Saggi (2004). Mode of Foreign Entry, Technology
Transfer, and FDI Policy. Journal of Development Economics, 75, 95111.
[28] Niosi, J., P. Hanel, and L. Fiset (1995). Technology transfer to developing countries
through engineering rms: the Canadian experience. World Development, 23, 10,
1815-1824.
[29] Ramachandran, V. (1993). Technology Transfer, Firm Ownership, and Investment in
Human Capital. Review of Economics and Statistics, 75, 66470.
29
[30] Saggi, K. (1996). Entry into a foreign market: foreign direct investment versus licensing.
Review of International Economics, 4, 99-104.
[31] Saggi, K. (1999). Foreign direct investment, licensing, and incentives for innovation.
Review of International Economics, 7, 699-714.
[32] Teece, D. J. (1977). Technology transfer by multinational rms: The resource cost of
transferring technological know-how. Economic Journal, 87, 242-261.
[33] Thurber and Istad (2010). Norways Evolving Champion: Statoil and the Politics of
State Enterprise. Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Work-
ing Paper No. 92.
[34] Wade, R. (1990). Governing the market - Economic theory and the role of government
in East Asian industrialization. Princeton University Press.
[35] Wang, J. and M. Blomström (1992). Foreign investment and technology transfer: a
simple model. European Economic Review, 36, 137155.
[36] Wells, L. T. (1983). Third world multinationals: the rise of foreign investments from
developing countries. MIT Press Books.
30
Research Memoranda of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
2011   
2011-1 Yoshifumi Takahashi 
Peter Nijkamp 
Multifunctional agricultural land use in sustainable world, 25 p. 
   
2011-2 Paulo A.L.D. Nunes 
Peter Nijkamp 
Biodiversity: Economic perspectives, 37 p. 
   
2011-3 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Doan Nainggolan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Marco Painho 
A complex spatial systems analysis of tourism and urban sprawl in the Algarve, 
23 p. 
   
2011-4 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Strangers on the move. Ethnic entrepreneurs as urban change actors, 34 p. 
   
2011-5 Manie Geyer 
Helen C. Coetzee 
Danie Du Plessis 
Ronnie Donaldson 
Peter Nijkamp 
Recent business transformation in intermediate-sized cities in South Africa, 30 
p. 
   
2011-6 Aki Kangasharju 
Christophe Tavéra 
Peter Nijkamp 
Regional growth and unemployment. The validity of Okun’s law for the Finnish 
regions, 17 p. 
   
2011-7 Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
Peter Nijkamp 
A Schumpeterian model of entrepreneurship, innovation, and regional economic 
growth, 30 p. 
   
2011-8 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Tüzin Baycan Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
The engine of sustainable rural development: Embeddedness of entrepreneurs in 
rural Turkey, 17 p. 
   
2011-9 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
A systemic perspective on multi-stakeholder sustainable development strategies, 
26 p. 
   
2011-10 Tibert Verhagen 
Jaap van Nes 
Frans Feldberg 
Willemijn van Dolen 
Virtual customer service agents: Using social presence and personalization to 
shape online service encounters, 48 p. 
   
2011-11 Henk J. Scholten 
Maarten van der Vlist 
De inrichting van crisisbeheersing, de relatie tussen besluitvorming en 
informatievoorziening. Casus: Warroom project Netcentrisch werken bij 
Rijkswaterstaat, 23 p. 
   
2011-12 Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
A socio-economic impact analysis of cultural diversity, 22 p. 
   
2011-13 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Repositioning rural areas as promising future hot spots, 22 p. 
   
2011-14 Selmar Meents How sellers can stimulate purchasing in electronic marketplaces: Using 
Tibert Verhagen 
Paul Vlaar 
information as a risk reduction signal, 29 p. 
   
   
2011-15 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Measuring regional creative capacity: A literature review for rural-specific 
approaches, 22 p. 
   
2011-16 Frank Bruinsma 
Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Tourism, culture and e-services: Evaluation of e-services packages, 30 p. 
   
2011-17 Peter Nijkamp 
Frank Bruinsma 
Karima Kourtit 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Supply of and demand for e-services in the cultural sector: Combining top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives, 16 p. 
   
2011-18 Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Climate change: From global concern to regional challenge, 17 p. 
   
2011-19 Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Operational advances in tourism research, 25 p. 
   
2011-20 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Creative capacity for sustainable development: A comparative analysis of 
European and Turkish rural regions, 18 p. 
   
2011-21 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Business dynamics as the source of counterurbanisation: An empirical analysis 
of Turkey, 18 p. 
   
2011-22 Jessie Bakens 
Peter Nijkamp 
Lessons from migration impact analysis, 19 p. 
   
2011-23 Peter Nijkamp 
Galit Cohen-
blankshtain 
Opportunities and pitfalls of local e-democracy, 17 p. 
   
2011-24 Maura Soekijad 
Irene Skovgaard Smith 
The ‘lean people’ in hospital change: Identity work as social differentiation, 30 
p. 
   
2011-25 Evgenia Motchenkova 
Olgerd Rus 
Research joint ventures and price collusion: Joint analysis of the impact of R&D 
subsidies and antitrust fines, 30 p. 
   
2011-26 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Strategic choice analysis by expert panels for migration impact assessment, 41 
p. 
   
2011-27  Faroek Lazrak 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Jan Rouwendal 
The market value of listed heritage: An urban economic application of spatial 
hedonic pricing, 24 p. 
   
2011-28 Peter Nijkamp Socio-economic impacts of heterogeneity among foreign migrants: Research 
and policy challenges, 17 p. 
   
2011-29 Masood Gheasi  
Peter Nijkamp 
Migration, tourism and international trade: Evidence from the UK, 8 p. 
   
2011-30 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Frank Bruinsma 
Evaluation of cyber-tools in cultural tourism, 24 p. 
   
2011-31 Cathy Macharis 
Peter Nijkamp 
Possible bias in multi-actor multi-criteria transportation evaluation: Issues and 
solutions, 16 p. 
   
2011-32 John Steenbruggen 
Maria Teresa 
Borzacchiello 
Peter Nijkamp 
Henk Scholten 
The use of GSM data for transport safety management: An exploratory review, 
29 p. 
   
2011-33 John Steenbruggen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jan M. Smits 
Michel Grothe 
Traffic incident management: A common operational picture to support 
situational awareness of sustainable mobility, 36 p. 
   
2011-34 Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Students’ interest in an entrepreneurial career in a multicultural society, 25 p. 
   
2011-35 Adele Finco 
Deborah Bentivoglio 
Peter Nijkamp 
Integrated evaluation of biofuel production options in agriculture: An 
exploration of sustainable policy scenarios, 16 p. 
   
2011-36 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Pedro Cabral 
Mário Caetano 
Peter Nijkamp 
Marco Paínho 
Urban heritage endangerment at the interface of future cities and past heritage: 
A spatial vulnerability assessment, 25 p. 
   
2011-37 Maria Giaoutzi 
Anastasia Stratigea 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Scenario analysis in foresight: AG2020, 23 p. 
   
2011-38 Peter Nijkamp 
Patricia van Hemert 
Knowledge infrastructure and regional growth, 12 p. 
   
2011-39 Patricia van Hemert 
Enno Masurel 
Peter Nijkamp 
 
The role of knowledge sources of SME’s for innovation perception and regional 
innovation policy, 27 p. 
2011-40 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Marco Painho 
Peter Nijkamp 
Impacts of environmental law and regulations on agricultural land-use change 
and urban pressure: The Algarve case, 18 p. 
   
2011-41 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Steef Lowik 
Frans van Vught 
Paul Vulto 
From islands of innovation to creative hotspots, 26 p. 
   
2011-42 Alina Todiras 
Peter Nijkamp 
Saidas Rafijevas 
Innovative marketing strategies for national industrial flagships: Brand 
repositioning for accessing upscale markets, 27 p. 
2011-43 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Mário Caetano 
Peter Nijkamp 
A multi-level spatial urban pressure analysis of the Giza Pyramid Plateau in 
Egypt, 18 p. 
   
2011-44 Andrea Caragliu 
Chiara Del Bo 
Peter Nijkamp 
A map of human capital in European cities, 36 p. 
   
2011-45 Patrizia Lombardi 
Silvia Giordano 
Andrea Caragliu 
Chiara Del Bo 
Mark Deakin 
Peter Nijkamp 
Karima Kourtit 
An advanced triple-helix network model for smart cities performance, 22 p. 
   
2011-46 Jessie Bakens 
Peter Nijkamp 
Migrant heterogeneity and urban development: A conceptual analysis, 17 p. 
   
2011-47 Irene Casas 
Maria Teresa 
Borzacchiello 
Biagio Ciuffo 
Peter Nijkamp 
Short and long term effects of sustainable mobility policy: An exploratory case 
study, 20 p. 
   
2011-48 Christian Bogmans Can globalization outweigh free-riding? 27 p. 
   
2011-49 Karim Abbas 
Bernd Heidergott 
Djamil Aïssani 
A Taylor series expansion approach to the functional approximation of finite 
queues, 26 p. 
   
2011-50 Eric Koomen Indicators of rural vitality. A GIS-based analysis of socio-economic 
development of the rural Netherlands, 17 p. 
   
   
2012-1 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jacques Poot 
The role of local and newcomer entrepreneurs in rural development: A 
comparative meta-analytic study, 39 p. 
2012   
   
2012-2 Joao Romao 
Bart Neuts 
Peter Nijkamp 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Urban tourist complexes as Multi-product companies: Market segmentation and 
product differentiation in Amsterdam, 18 p. 
   
2012-3 Vincent A.C. van den 
Berg 
Step tolling with price sensitive demand: Why more steps in the toll makes the 
consumer better off, 20 p. 
   
2012-4 Vasco Diogo 
Eric Koomen 
Floor van der Hilst 
Second generation biofuel production in the Netherlands. A spatially-explicit 
exploration of the economic viability of a perennial biofuel crop, 12 p. 
   
2012-5 Thijs Dekker 
Paul Koster 
Roy Brouwer 
Changing with the tide: Semi-parametric estimation of preference dynamics, 50 
p. 
   
2012-6 Daniel Arribas 
Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Benchmarking of world cities through self-organizing maps, 22 p. 
   
2012-7 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Frans van Vught 
Paul Vulto 
Supernova stars in knowledge-based regions, 24 p. 
   
2012-8 Mediha Sahin 
Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
The economic importance of migrant entrepreneurship: An application of data 
envelopment analysis in the Netherlands, 16 p. 
   
2012-9 Peter Nijkamp 
Jacques Poot 
Migration impact assessment: A state of the art, 48 p. 
   
2012-10 Tibert Verhagen 
Anniek Nauta 
Frans Feldberg 
Negative online word-of-mouth: Behavioral indicator or emotional release? 29 
p. 
   
2013   
   
2013-1 Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
The migration development nexus: New perspectives and challenges, 22 p. 
   
2013-2 Haralambie Leahu European Options Sensitivities via Monte Carlo Techniques, 28 p. 
   
2013-3 Tibert Verhagen 
Charlotte Vonkeman 
Frans Feldberg 
Plon Verhagen 
 
Making online products more tangible and likeable: The role of local presence 
as product presentation mechanism, 44 p. 
2013-4 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
A Multi-actor multi-criteria scenario analysis of regional sustainable resource 
policy, 24 p. 
   
2013-5 John Steenbruggen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Maarten van der Vlist 
Urban traffic incident management in a digital society. An actor-network 
approach in information technology use in urban Europe, 25 p. 
   
2013-6 Jorge Ridderstaat 
Robertico Croes 
Peter Nijkamp 
The force field of tourism, 19 p. 
   
2013-7 Masood Gheasi 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Unknown diversity: A study on undocumented migrant workers in the Dutch    
household sector, 17 p. 
   
2013-8 Mediha Sahin 
Peter Nijkamp 
Soushi Suzuki 
Survival of the fittest among migrant entrepreneurs. A study on differences in 
the efficiency performance of migrant entrepreneurs in Amsterdam by means of 
data envelopment analysis, 25 p. 
   
2013-9 Kostas Bithas 
Peter Nijkamp 
Biological integrity as a prerequisite for sustainable development: A 
bioeconomic perspective, 24 p. 
   
2013-10 Madalina-Stefania 
Dirzu 
Peter Nijkamp 
The dynamics of agglomeration processes and their contribution to regional 
development across the EU, 19 p. 
   
2013-11 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Agnieszka Walczynska 
Peter Nijkamp 
Regional challenges in tourist wetland systems: An integrated approach to the 
Ria Formosa area, 17 p. 
   
2013-12 João Romão 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Bart Neuts 
Peter Nijkamp 
Tourist loyalty and urban e-services: A comparison of behavioural impacts in 
Leipzig and Amsterdam, 19 p. 
   
2013-13 Jorge Ridderstaat 
Marck Oduber 
Robertico Croes 
Peter Nijkamp 
Pim Martens 
Impacts of seasonal patterns of climate on recurrent fluctuations in tourism 
demand. Evidence from Aruba, 34 p. 
   
2013-14 Emmanouil Tranos 
Peter Nijkamp 
Urban and regional analysis and the digital revolution: Challenges and 
opportunities, 16 p. 
   
2013-15 Masood Gheasi 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
International financial transfer by foreign labour: An analysis of remittances 
from informal migrants, 11 p. 
   
2013-16 Serenella Sala 
Biagio Ciuffo 
Peter Nijkamp 
A meta-framework for sustainability assessment, 24 p. 
   
2013-17 Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Masood Gheasi 
Foresights, scenarios and sustainable development – a pluriformity perspective, 
19 p.  
   
2013-18 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Analytical support tools for sustainable futures, 19 p. 
   
2013-19 Peter Nijkamp Migration impact assessment: A review of evidence-based findings, 29 p. 
   
2013-20 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Sustainability science as a basis for policy evaluation, 16 p. 
   
2013-21 Vicky Katsoni 
Maria Giaoutzi 
Peter Nijkamp 
Market segmentation in tourism – An operational assessment framework, 28 p. 
   
2013-22 Jorge Ridderstaat 
Robertico Croes 
Peter Nijkamp 
Tourism development, quality of life and exogenous shocks. A systemic 
analysis framework, 26 p. 
   
2013-23 Feng Xu 
Nan Xiang 
Shanshan Wang 
Peter Nijkamp 
Yoshiro Higano 
Dynamic simulation of China’s carbon emission reduction potential by 2020, 12 
p. 
   
2013-24 John Steenbruggen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jan M. Smits 
Ghaitrie Mohabir 
Traffic incident and disaster management in the Netherlands: Challenges and 
obstacles in information sharing, 30 p. 
   
2013-25 Patricia van Hemert 
Peter Nijkamp 
Enno Masurel 
From innovation to commercialization through networks and agglomerations: 
Analysis of sources of innovation, innovation capabilities and performance of 
Dutch SMEs, 24 p. 
   
2013-26 Patricia van Hemert 
Peter Nijkamp 
Enno Masurel 
How do SMEs learn in a systems-of-innovation context? The role of sources of 
innovation and absorptive capacity on the innovation performance of Dutch 
SMEs, 27 p. 
   
2013-27 Mediha Sahin 
Alina Todiras 
Peter Nijkamp 
Colourful entrepreneurship in Dutch cities: A review and analysis of business 
performance, 25 p. 
   
2013-28 Tüzin Baycan 
Mediha Sahin 
Peter Nijkamp 
The urban growth potential of second-generation migrant entrepreneurs. A 
sectoral study on Amsterdam, 31 p. 
2013-29 Eric Vaz 
Teresa de Noronha 
Vaz 
Peter Nijkamp 
The architecture of firms’ innovative behaviors, 23 p. 
   
2013-30 Eric Vaz 
Marco Painho 
Peter Nijkamp 
Linking agricultural policies with decision making: A spatial approach, 21 p. 
   
2013-31 Yueting Guo 
Hengwei Wang 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jiangang XU 
Space-time changes in interdependent urban-environmental systems: A policy 
study on the Huai River Basin in China, 20 p. 
   
2013-32 Maurice de Kleijn 
Niels van Manen 
Jan Kolen 
Henk Scholten 
User-centric SDI framework applied to historical and heritage European 
landscape research, 31 p. 
   
2013-33 Erik van der Zee 
Henk Scholten 
Application of geographical concepts and spatial technology to the Internet of 
Things, 35 p. 
   
2013-34 Mehmet Güney Celbiş 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jacques Poot 
The lucrative impact of trade-related infrastructure: Meta-Analytic Evidence, 45 
p. 
   
2013-35 Marco Modica 
Aura Reggiani 
Peter Nijkamp 
Are Gibrat and Zipf Monozygotic or Heterozygotic Twins? A Comparative 
Analysis of Means and Variances in Complex Urban Systems, 34 p. 
   
2013-36 Bernd Heidergott 
Haralambie Leahu 
Warren Volk-
Makarewicz 
A Smoothed Perturbation Analysis Approach to Parisian Options, 14 p. 
   
2013-37 Peter Nijkamp 
Waldemar Ratajczak 
The Spatial Economy – A Holistic Perspective, 14 p. 
   
2013-38 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
New Entrepreneurship in Urban Diasporas in our Modern World, 22 p. 
   
2014   
   
2014-1 John Steenbruggen 
Emmanouil Tranos 
Peter Nijkamp 
Data from mobile phone operators: A tool for smarter cities? 22 p. 
   
2014-2 John Steenbruggen Tourism geography: Emerging trends and initiatives to support tourism in 
Morocco, 29 p. 
   
2015   
   
2015-1 Maurice de Kleijn 
Rens de Hond 
Oscar Martinez-Rubi 
Pjotr Svetachov 
A 3D Geographic Information System for ‘Mapping the Via Appia’, 11 p. 
   
2015-2 Gilberto Mahumane 
Peter Mulder 
Introducing MOZLEAP: an integrated long-run scenario model of the emerging 
energy sector of Mozambique, 35 p. 
   
2015-3 Karim Abbas 
Joost Berkhout 
Bernd Heidergott 
A Critical Account of Perturbation Analysis of Markovian Systems, 28 p. 
   
2015-4 Nahom Ghebrihiwet 
Evgenia Motchenkova 
Technology Transfer by Foreign Multinationals, Local Investment, and FDI 
Policy, 31 p. 
   
 
